Wildlife and Conflict: The Cost of Biodiversity Protection Policies
Our planet is experiencing the first human-induced mass extinction of species. In response, policymakers have implemented international trade bans to preserve rare animals and forest species such as rhinos, elephants, and rosewood. Yet little research examines their consequences. Combining georeferenced habitat maps of wild animals and trees with armed conflict data, I uncover sizable adverse effects of international trade ban treaties. First, event-study estimates reveal that bans raise the likelihood of conflict in habitat areas by about 40%. Two findings support a windfall-related conflict mechanism. For elephant ivory, a natural experiment shows that, in response to supply-side policies, prices change, which in turn changes the likelihood of conflict events in their habitat. Given the elephant's broad habitat, the implied magnitude exceeds that of well-studied conflict minerals. For wild trees, satellite data show that harvesting shifts from high- to low-capacity states once bans are imposed, generating rents that spark violence. An analysis of battle locations before and after the policy reveals that militias and rebels expand into new, distant areas and are more likely to gain territorial control—consistent with a feasibility mechanism in which windfalls relax budget constraints. A quantitative model suggests that a targeted policy restricting trade in states with strong institutions and smaller wildlife stocks can conserve resources while limiting conflict. Given these spillovers, international trade bans, if maintained, should be accompanied by state-building support for low-income countries, which often lack enforcement capacity.
Funding: Wheeler Institute, Horowitz Foundation, ReCIPE
A Demand System Approach to Endangered Species Protection
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the international treaty CITES, which seeks to protect endangered tree species by restricting their trade. I first construct a novel species-level measure of harvesting activity using satellite data and validate its accuracy. Second, I estimate a staggered-adoption synthetic-control event-study specification to causally identify the treaty’s impact, revealing substantial heterogeneity in effectiveness across species and regions. Third, to inform policy design, I estimate own- and cross-price elasticities for precious tree species using an Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). Some protected species exhibit positive own-price elasticities—consistent with Veblen goods—complicating conservation efforts that rely on supply restrictions, as such restrictions may unintentionally increase demand. Finally, using the estimated elasticities, I quantify alternative counterfactual policies and propose targeted strategies that account for positive price responsiveness. In particular, counterfactual simulations suggest that restricting trade only in species that have negative own-price elasticities—obey the Law of Demand—or imposing simultaneous rather than sequential bans on endangered species and their close substitutes, leads to better environmental outcomes.
Wildlife Poaching and the Labour Market (with Etienne Le Rossignol)
Using data on elephant poaching and the harvesting of endangered precious tree species across Africa and Asia, we document substitution between employment in local agriculture—the labour-intensive sector—and wildlife poaching. Positive economic shocks to agriculture reduce poaching of both elephants and endangered trees. A national-level crop minimum price or crop disaster insurance policies reduce elephant poaching. A sector-biased, trade-liberalising reforms that lower agricultural employment increase elephant poaching. This is consistent with predictions from a standard 2 by 2 trade model, which we use as a conceptual framework. Finally, using household survey data on bushmeat consumption, we show that consumption patterns are highly correlated with poaching intensity and can serve as a proxy in regions where formal monitoring is limited. This approach expands the spatial coverage of poaching data and offers policymakers a practical tool for improving the monitoring and management of poaching crises.
Carbon Colonialism (with Etienne Le Rossignol and Orlando Roman)
[Project Description], [Slides]
This research investigates the socioeconomic and environmental consequences of newly established market-based forest preservation policy, implemented by private enterprises in partnership with local governments and firms in sub-Saharan Africa. In return, these initiatives invest in local education, health, and infrastructure. We hand-collect data on—nearly—the universe of privately-run carbon concessions across Africa and, using a staggered event-study synthetic control approach, estimate their impact on both forest preservation and economic activity using nighttime luminosity data. To explore the underlying economic mechanisms, we employ a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD) with DHS data, comparing villages located just inside and just outside the concession boundaries.
Funding: Wheeler Institute, ReCIPE
Conservation Through Representation: Indigenous Politicians and Forest Protection in the Brazilian Amazon (with Gabriel S. Gaspar)
[Slides]
Indigenous populations in the Americas, while comprising a minority, exert significant control over extensive demarcated territories. In Brazil, indigenous communities govern approximately 15% of the national territory and nearly 25% of the Amazon rainforest. However, the influence of indigenous political representation on environmental outcomes remains poorly understood. This paper examines the effects of electing an indigenous politician to the city council, leveraging close elections as a natural experiment. Regression discontinuity estimates suggest a substantial reduction in deforestation rates in municipalities that narrowly elected an indigenous councillor compared to otherwise similar areas. These effects are particularly pronounced in locations with larger indigenous populations and greater shares of indigenous territory.