Wildlife and Conflict: The Cost of Biodiversity
Protection Policies
Scientific evidence shows that we are going through the first human-induced mass extinction, and as such, conservation policies are widely discussed among policymakers. However, there is little research on the harmful externalities of such policies. This paper combines global georeferenced data on wildlife habitats (including both animal and tree species) with information on armed conflict to estimate the violent externalities generated by international trade restrictions on wildlife products aimed at conserving biodiversity. An event-study specification shows that the imposition of trade restrictions increases the risk of conflict in affected areas. Two-stage least squares estimates for elephant ivory show that trade restrictions increase prices, which in turn increase the likelihood of conflict. Accounting for the spatial distribution of elephants, the implied effect size exceeds that of well-documented industrial conflict minerals. For precious trees, remote sensing analysis suggests that, once restrictions are in place, production shifts from states with high institutional capacity to those with low capacity, generating local windfall rents that fuel additional violence. A distance analysis shows that armed groups positioned to capture these rents expand operations into new areas and become more likely to gain territorial control, supporting the “feasibility” mechanism whereby windfall gains relax their budget constraints and enable violence. A quantitative social planner general equilibrium model shows that a targeted policy restricting trade in states with both high institutional capacity and relatively small stocks of precious trees could improve welfare. The findings document a previously overlooked conflict-related cost of conservation policy and suggest a mitigation strategy.
A Demand System Approach to Endangered Species Protection
This paper evaluates the effectiveness of the international treaty CITES, which seeks to protect biodiversity by restricting trade in endangered tree species. I construct a novel, species-level measure of harvesting activity from remote sensing and validate its accuracy. Using this measure, I estimate a staggered event-study synthetic control design to causally identify the treaty’s impact, revealing substantial heterogeneity in effectiveness across species and regions. To inform policy design, I then estimate own- and cross-price elasticities for precious tree species using the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS). Some protected species exhibit positive price elasticities, consistent with Veblen goods. This violation of the Law of Demand complicates conservation efforts that rely on supply restrictions, as such policies may unintentionally increase demand. In light of these findings, I simulate counterfactual policies and propose alternative strategies that account for positive price responsiveness to improve the protection of high-value species.
Wildlife Poaching and the Labour Market (with Etienne Le Rossignol)
Using data on elephant poaching and the harvesting of protected tree species across Africa and Asia, we document substitution between employment in local agriculture—the labour-intensive sector—and wildlife poaching. Positive economic shocks to agriculture reduce poaching of both elephants and trees, while sector-biased, trade-liberalising reforms that lower agricultural employment increase elephant poaching, consistent with predictions from a standard $2 \times 2$ trade model. Finally, leveraging household survey data on bushmeat consumption, we propose a complementary method to expand the spatial coverage of poaching data, providing policymakers with a more robust framework for monitoring and responding to poaching crises.
Carbon Colonialism (with Etienne Le Rossignol and Orlando Roman)
This research investigates the socioeconomic and environmental consequences of newly established market-based forest preservation policy, implemented by private enterprises in partnership with local governments and firms in sub-Saharan Africa. In return, these initiatives invest in local education, health, and infrastructure. We hand-collect data on—nearly—the universe of privately-run carbon concessions across Africa and, using a staggered event-study synthetic control approach, estimate their impact on both forest preservation and economic activity using nighttime luminosity data. To explore the underlying economic mechanisms, we employ a spatial regression discontinuity design (RDD) with DHS data, comparing villages located just inside and just outside the concession boundaries.
Conservation Through Representation: Indigenous Politicians and Forest Protection in the Brazilian Amazon (with Gabriel S. Gaspar)
Indigenous populations in the Americas, while comprising a minority, exert significant control over extensive demarcated territories. In Brazil, indigenous communities govern approximately 15\% of the national territory and nearly 25\% of the Amazon rainforest. However, the influence of indigenous political representation on environmental outcomes remains poorly understood. This paper examines the effects of electing an indigenous politician to the city council, leveraging close elections as a natural experiment. Regression discontinuity estimates suggest a substantial reduction in deforestation rates in municipalities that narrowly elected an indigenous councillor compared to otherwise similar areas. These effects are particularly pronounced in locations with larger indigenous populations and greater shares of indigenous territory.